[Please note that this version of this text has been recovered from an early draft due to a server crash. There may be a few typos and even mistakes in the following]
Conclusions.
[Scholars, philosophers, and leaders
of the world] have convinced
themselves that man, the worst transgressor
of all species, is the
crown of creation. All other creatures were created merely to
provide
him with food, pelts, to be tormented,
exterminated. In relation
to them, all people are Nazis; for the
animals it is an eternal
Treblinka.
Isaac
Bashevis Singer, ‘The Letter Writer’,
from
The Seance and Other Stories.
In the first years of the twenty-first century, animal
rights advocates undoubtedly have a most substantial task ahead of them if they
aspire to seriously convince people that they act just like Nazis toward
nonhuman animals. The evidence presented
in this thesis suggests that, for the vast majority, analogies between the fate
of the human Jews in World War II and the plight of contemporary nonhumans will
be regarded as utterly mystifying and outrageous: outrage will undoubtedly
descend upon social historian Charles Patterson whose recent book, Eternal Treblinka: Our treatment of animals
and the Holocaust, dares to make this very comparison (Patterson 2002).
The
sociology of human-nonhuman relations suggests that the philosophical
foundations of Western ‘civilisation’ would disallow such an analogy. Both ancient philosophers and jurists
declared that nonhuman animals are on earth for ‘us’. The philosophical challenge to such views is
a relatively recent phenomenon, while the legal challenge is younger still,
having occurred only in the last decade or so.
Furthermore, the sociology of human-nonhuman relations reveals that longstanding
cultural constructions rule out such unwarranted and unwelcome
comparisons. Moreover, this study shows
that the conventional societal orientation sympathetic to the moral orthodoxy
concerning human-nonhuman relations would also find the correlation appalling
if not rather silly. In this welfarist
view, how can a modern commitment to the strict regulation of ‘humane
treatment’ be compared with the grotesque details of Nazi atrocities? Sociological analysis highlights how daily
social practice suggests that the analogy must, for most, be ridiculous
nonsense. How could such a monstrous
analogy apply to, say, ‘animal loving’ Britain ? Don’t ‘we’ demonstrably care for
animals? Don’t ‘we’ animal lovers weep
if they get a disease or become ill?
However.
Given that the overarching theme of the present work
has been engaged in identifying major social factors that create and maintain a
speciesist orientation in human-nonhuman relations, then the evidence in the
pages above suggests that the initially disturbing comparison with Nazism is
not so far-fetched.
There
has been a deliberate emphasis throughout this work on social process and
processes, such as the socialisation processes.
Understanding any society in which forms of exploitation are
institutionalised, widely internalised, and seen as acceptable, is not to
expect some demigod is present to charismatically suggest to all and sundry
that this social attitude is to be favoured.
Weber states that modern society becomes dominated by instrumental
rationality over time. Societal
attitudes and social practices evolve slowly over time, mediated by, and
mediating, social norms and values which are shaped by sociopolitical and
economic factors. The intention of this
thesis throughout has been directed toward advancing the understanding of
contemporary social attitudes concerning human-nonhuman relations. Examining firmly sedimented social belief
about other animals this thesis serves to reveal how, by physically and systematically
dominating and exploiting nonhumans for a range of instrumental and sentimental
reasons, societies have sought to construct and maintain fundamental human
superiority claims to justify both the socialised treatment of - and human
views about - other animals.
As
evidence presented here suggests, human-nonhuman relation claims are regarded
as sufficiently meaningful, fixed and rudimentary even to the extent that
individual human beings and whole communities can be conceptually stripped of
their humanity; stripped, therefore, of the hope of being rightholders;
stripped of being legal and social ‘persons’.
When this occurs, when human beings as individuals or in groups are
portrayed as mere ‘things’ just like nonhuman animals, then they are
effectively placed in serious harm’s way.
In effect, social orientations toward human-nonhuman relations can help
end the alleged special protection humans are offered just by ‘being human’
(Bauman & May 2001: 75).
The
preceding pages present evidence that methods exist – and are currently
employed - that ‘reduce’ humans into ‘devalued’, ‘subhuman’, and ultimately
‘nonhuman’ categories. Clearly, in the
social construction of other animals, ‘animal’ means ‘harmable’ or, more
technically, nonhuman interests may be sacrificed
to satisfy many human ones. Those who
have exploited other human beings attempted to align individuals and groups
alongside those already constructed
as essentially existing to serve some human need or utilisation. Both dehumanisation and depersonalisation
processes are regularly employed and organised in periods of war. They are systematically used in military
training techniques, in many pornographic portrayals, and in general racist and
sexist discourse. The processes employed
rely heavily on widespread a-priori
social understandings about nonhuman-human distinctions and associated moral
worth. They draw on the various
widespread social practices - Mason’s ‘rituals of dominionism’ - involving the
human (mis)treatment of other animals, while maintaining the ideological
message in which nonhumans occupy ‘natural’, or ‘God-given’, ‘devalued’,
‘lower-than’, and therefore ‘harmable’, ‘usable’, ‘exploitable’ and easily
‘killable’ categories of being.
Interrelated
philosophy, theology, social practice, underlying ideology and social discourse
serves as effective ‘constructors of sufficient difference’ which provides
moral distance between humans and nonhumans.
Indeed, over time humans seem to have often sought to mark any discernible differences, declare
them as morally relevant, all in order to override the sentiency and
subject-of-a-life status of billions of nonhumans, effectively undermining the
evolutionary kinship between human animals and nonhuman ones.
Jasper
(1999: 77) correctly suggests that modern humans hold on to the two
exploitative orientations towards other animals. Both have been discussed in this thesis. The
first orientation involves the qualified acceptance of the instrumental use of
other animals as resources, while the other utilisation is mainly sentimental,
although this second category seems also to contain a good deal of its own
instrumental intent. Added to dominant
non-animal rights philosophical and theological positions with regard to nonhuman
animals and human beings, the self-serving and economically-driven ‘pro-use’
arguments seeking to maintain profitable orientations towards the moral status
quo are encountered. Such groups, as
seen in Guither’s work, have their own financial justifications for the
continuation of the human exploitation of nonhuman animals.
As
indicated above, substantial parts of this thesis have emphasised the vital
‘maintenance’ role played by the lifelong socialisation processes in the
preservation of present attitudes about the ethical status of both human and
nonhuman beings. While on-going and
day-to-day experience bolster societywide orientations toward other animals,
the professional socialisation of those whose livelihoods and identities are
bound up with various forms of ‘using’ other animals provides this group with
further incentives to support current welfarist conceptualisations of
human-nonhuman relations. In the light
of factors such as these, any sociological analysis cannot ignore overarching
consequences of individuals - the vast majority in most modern societies -
being socialised as ideological and practising speciesists. In a culture
that routinely exploits other animals, the phrase ‘they know not what they do’
can be properly applied to its children.
Daily, they experience beings they meet as meat; or know them as
playthings and as personal or family possessions. In a great many aspects of their social
learning, children are socialised from their earliest years within an
overarching and deeply speciesist ideology to accept the human use of other
animals in all its forms. The
significance of this for animal rights advocates is clear. As Bauman has indicated, the simplest thing
people do with regard to core social values is abide by them; indeed, just as many Nazis and Germans did. Since this is exactly what the unreflexive
majority does with regard to dominant social values about human-nonhuman
relations, supporters of animal rights must understand that their own personal
transcendence of orthodox attitudes are exceptions to a widely kept rule. Most people, quite simply, ‘go with the
flow’. Perhaps the degree to which
animal advocates are thought to have broken away from prevailing ideology about
human-nonhuman relations can be seen reflected in the extent to which animal
welfarism remains a part of the animal protection movement’s central claims
making relating to the treatment of other animals by human beings.
A
full appreciation of the magnitude of the task before animal advocates, assuming
a commitment to public education strategies rather than to the more militant
examples of ‘direct action’, requires – in part at least, an acknowledgement of
answers to the research questions posed throughout this thesis. Clearly spelt out in the pages above,
described step-by-step, are elements of the construction and maintenance
systems both creating and sustaining societywide speciesist social
attitudes. The prevalence of various
‘us’ and ‘them’ categories, and the social construction of ‘insiders’ and
‘outsiders’ are seen to further the aims of the racist, the sexist, the
homophobe and so on. Such categorical
distinctions, however, are seen to be somewhat dependent on core speciesist
attitudes, as Bauman indicates. There
are social attitudes that feed into and rely upon orthodox views of nonhuman
animals and conventional perceptions about human-nonhuman relations.
These
attitudes that are built on and plug into firm social understandings of human
supremacy claims, the significance of the ‘species barrier’, and the harmful
uses which the notion of ‘the barrier’ accommodates. To the extent that exploitative relations
among human beings are facilitated by dehumanisation processes, findings in
this thesis suggest that opponents of such exploitation and advocates of human
rights need to acknowledge central speciesist conceptualisations when humans
exploit, harm, and kill each other as well as other ‘others’.
Human
societies reveal their misothery by objectifying other animals, commodifying
them, making them items of various types of consumption, retaining them as
items of property and ‘legal things’ by law.
In society, if humans ‘damage’ a nonhuman animal, including killing him
or her, they may find themselves accused and charged with causing ‘criminal
damage’; that is, causing damage to the ‘animal property’ of another human
being. As with once legal forms of human
slavery, such social forces maintain exploitative relations. These are further aspects of a speciesist
world into which the young are routinely socialised and, therefore, children
learn the norms and values of animal hating and animal loving societies. Into largely misotherous cultures most people
are thrust: cast into societies that continually underlines the ideology that
‘‘Man’ is king’.
A
world that remains characterised by racism and sexism declares over and over
again that everything that exists in the world exists for human beings: each and everything other than fellow humans are
‘resources for the use of’.
Language
reveals how humans hate and love other animals and animal life, as they
continue to use traditional human-nonhuman orientations to maintain unequal
human relations. It has been shown that
to call someone an ‘animal’ is to confer upon them a truly negative label: human
serial killers are not human according to the popular press: they cannot be
allowed the glory of the label ‘human’, so they are named ‘animals’
instead. Such people, after all, ‘behave
like animals’. Societies reserve this
tag for the cruellest people they can
think of. Mason says this is because
modern humans see nonhuman animals and nature as vicious, base, and
contemptible.
As shown in virtually every section of the present
thesis, none of the above contradicts any of the principal premises of orthodox
animal welfarism. Indeed, the foregone
merely affirms for many the absolute need for the normative regulatory role of
animal welfare practice and enforcement.
Ideological animal welfarism reinforces the idea that theologians and
philosophers were and are correct to construct a ‘ladder of being’ as a
‘natural’ order because no substantial bad should result from it. Indeed, much good accrues for both humans and
nonhuman animals in present relations. A
product of on-going and thoroughly institutionalised social processes, integral
to humanity’s ‘agri-culture’, is the apparent difficulty that animal rights
positions seem to have in their ability to challenge the settled orthodox views
about the relations between humans and other animals. At the present time, and despite of (or
because of) more than thirty years of rhetorical ‘animal rights’ advocacy in
Britain, the conventional orthodoxy of animal welfarism continues to adequately
provide for the vast majority a secure, multi-purpose, and apparently ever
adaptable ideological framework supporting the prevailing industrialised
systems of animal exploitation and other modes of animal ownership. Animal welfarism helps to preserve rather
than expose or seriously question the exploitative rationality that firmly
sediments both conventional instrumental and sentimental attitudes about
nonhuman animals.
Taking
an ‘insider’s’ view of the animal protection movement for a moment, it seems to
be clear that rights views are presently engaged in a discursive relationship
with orthodox positions both inside and outside the animal protection
movement. Yet animal welfarism is so
firmly entrenched, and so widespread and customary, that it appears that even
many rights supporters have regular difficulty expressing, articulating and
advocating the full animal rights - or any largely non-welfarist - agenda. As far as the latter point goes, of course,
reluctance to advocate the whole ‘rights agenda’ has been traditionally seen in
the animal movement as the result of strategic choices and issues of ‘framing’
(Yates 1998). However, this reluctance
can also be seen as a reflection of the way animal welfarism succeeds in
presenting rights views as views that go beyond those that are necessary for
the well-being of nonhuman animals. A
central ‘difficulty’ for rights views stems from the fact that the resilient
orthodox outlook has preserved its authoritative ability to present its own
position as entirely ‘normal’, ‘reasonable’, ‘rational’, and the self-evidently
‘correct’ perspective by which any reasonable person ought to evaluate
human-nonhuman relations. For this
reason, as seen in the present work to some extent, the orthodox position
becomes the easy, confident, ‘non-extreme’ (and now more than ever,
‘non-terrorist’) means by which journalists, commentators, the majority of
animal advocates, pro-use advocates and politicians talk about the treatment of
nonhuman animals by humans.
From the outset, it was to be expected that the
ideology of animal welfarism would figure strongly throughout this thesis. That said, its utter centrality to virtually every level of discourse about human-nonhuman
relations is surprising. Whether
exploring philosophical and theological accounts, pro-use statements, political
pronouncements, economic dimensions, or journalistic orientations, animal
welfarism appears solidly entrenched as the significant defining and discursive
factor. It is not a bewilderment,
therefore, to discover that the limited number of rights-aware contributors to
recent animal email networks appear to appreciate more than ever that forms of
animal welfarism can seem to stand as serious impediments to the articulation,
advocacy, and realisation of genuine animal rights aspirations.
In a
thoroughly frustrating way, animal welfarism seems to amount to a barrier or
filter which effectively prevents, or at least serves to mediate, the public
rendition of a genuine animal rights philosophy. Animal welfarism appears as a fog in which rights
discourse regularly becomes lost, misrepresented and redirected. Animal rights advocates who wish to test the
societal reception of their own views of human-nonhuman animals are apparently
hindered at every turn by a deeply internalised welfarist consciousness in most
of the audiences they seek to influence.
Over and above the prevalence of these continuing
social realities, it can surely be of no surprise (and of little comfort to any social movement advocate) that many
people are effectively afforded useful methods of ‘message avoidance’ and
evasion. Indeed, this thesis outlines
some of the sociological and social psychological evidence that suggests that a
general evasive orientation can effectively shield a great many so-called
‘postmodern’ men and women from engagement in numerous social and political
issues related or not with nonhuman animals and notions of animal rights. However, in relation to the treatment of
other animals, it seems that institutionalised animal welfarism can assist in
the process of the avoidance of authentic animal rights views. In other words, it is entirely feasible that
those who wish to largely evade rights messages while not wanting to be seen as
doing anything unwarranted toward many nonhumans find the certainty and
centrality of traditional animal welfarism a comforting place of refuge. Given that welfarism is the ‘obvious’ lens
for assessing human-nonhuman relations, it is possible to demonstrate
socially-approved concern for other animals (the sentimental orientation) while
effectively side-stepping ‘extreme’ abolitionist rights positions. Animal welfarism provides society with a
remarkable means by which nonhuman animals can be used, killed, or owned - or
in other ways exploited by humans - while simultaneously maintaining a
persuasive ideological stance that declares that British society in particular
is dotty about animals and nonhuman care.
Such
a welfarist orientation simply would not be tenable in terms of human rights
issues. If it were, groups such as
Amnesty International may be found funding experiments on humans to discover
‘welfare-friendly’ methods of imprisonment and torture. Moreover, an orientation towards a ‘human
welfare movement’ based on the animal welfare model would presumable result in ‘free-range’
equivalents of child pornography based on production involving no ‘unnecessary’
suffering or harm to those so used.
Regan asks (1988) whether a human rights campaigner who declares an absolute opposition to rape, child
abuse, sexual discrimination and the abuse of the elderly would be seen as
holding an ‘extremist’ position. Regan
states that, ‘the plain fact is, moral truth often is extreme, and must be, for
when injustice is absolute, then one must oppose it - absolutely’.
Finally, Future Possibilities and Directions.
One relatively ‘new strand’ that has emerged within
the evolution of ‘animal rights’ thinking in recent years has been the still
growing academic interest in the issue.
Some of this work may prove to be very important in the history of
‘animal rights’ thinking; and its importance is recognised in recent works by
philosopher-advocates such as Regan and Ryder.
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