[Please note that this version of this text has been recovered from an early draft due to a server crash. There may be a few typos and even mistakes in the following]
The aims of Part Two of the thesis are fourfold. First, in making the case that ‘animal rights’ campaigning is a visible, acknowledged and sometimes actively debated social phenomenon, it is important to define and investigate exactly what the term ‘animal rights’ means to its various proponents, its detractors, media representatives and its opponents. Often placing the term in parenthesis throughout this section, and in previous sections of the thesis, is meant to indicate that explaining the ‘rights’ component in animal advocacy is far from a straightforward matter. Indeed, often a great deal of ‘animal rights’ campaigning has little direct connection to moral or legal rights formulations and, instead, ‘rights’ are employed rhetorically[1] by animal advocates in many instances. Secondly, as another aim in this second section of the thesis, more will be said about the distinction between traditional animal welfarism and forms of animal advocacy, including those based on genuine rights positions, that emerged since the 1970s.
The aims of Part Two of the thesis are fourfold. First, in making the case that ‘animal rights’ campaigning is a visible, acknowledged and sometimes actively debated social phenomenon, it is important to define and investigate exactly what the term ‘animal rights’ means to its various proponents, its detractors, media representatives and its opponents. Often placing the term in parenthesis throughout this section, and in previous sections of the thesis, is meant to indicate that explaining the ‘rights’ component in animal advocacy is far from a straightforward matter. Indeed, often a great deal of ‘animal rights’ campaigning has little direct connection to moral or legal rights formulations and, instead, ‘rights’ are employed rhetorically[1] by animal advocates in many instances. Secondly, as another aim in this second section of the thesis, more will be said about the distinction between traditional animal welfarism and forms of animal advocacy, including those based on genuine rights positions, that emerged since the 1970s.
Indeed, for many writers
concerned with human-nonhuman relations and associated social movement
activity, explaining the meaning(s) of animal rights involves, in the first
instance, demonstrating differences and distinctions that
set
genuine animal rights thought
apart from forms of animal welfare.
However, it is suggested that the failure to fully differentiate rights and welfare approaches
has
resulted in a failure to secure rights as the principal basis of making
human-nonhuman relations claims within the animal protection
movement. Institutionalised animal
welfarism, whether expressed by animal welfare advocates located in social
movement organisations, or animal welfare as interpreted
by ‘pro-use’ mobilisations, is the basis of an impending chapter concentrated chiefly on the social and political resilience
of this orthodox orientation to human-nonhuman relations. This is to say that, not only does animal
welfarism provide the established dominant paradigm by which any and all
‘animal issues’ are routinely evaluated, it is also the apparent ‘master-frame’
from which any genuine animal rights thinking must, in a sense, ‘depart from’
in order for its own distinctive perspectives to be publicly aired and thereby
tested. It is further suggested that the
resistance to rights even in ‘animal rights’ advocacy may be a
product of social movement strategic thinking
as much as a reflection of the complexities of rights theory. Despite widespread endorsement of
the idea of moral and legal rights, many animal advocates seem not to accept
that rights formulations are a good basis for arguing for the protection of
non-human individuals. Often, they claim
that ‘the public’ is not quite ready for animal rights, but can and do respond
to claims about animal cruelty and excessive levels of animal suffering.
Having looked in Part One
of the thesis at the social construction and maintenance of a general moral
orthodoxy relating to human and nonhuman beings, the further
analysis
of animal welfarism in this part of the work places greater concentration on
its apparent ability to effectively dominate
all levels of societal discourse concerning human-nonhuman relations. Common in discourse about human-nonhuman
relations are declarations that while ‘animal rights’ makes no sense, it is
possible to be oriented and committed to the notion of a duty of care toward
other animals, and supportive of the principle of not causing ‘unnecessary’
suffering during legitimate forms of animal exploitation.
Animal welfarism, especially pro-use versions aimed at maintaining and explaining the legitimacy of the human
exploitation of nonhuman resources, suggests that perspectives not based on traditional animal welfare are simply ‘not needed’ and are rather ‘unwelcome’ in any assessment of contemporary human-nonhuman relations: to borrow
from modern subcultural terminology, animal welfarism essentially asserts that
major aspects of the ‘animal question’ are ‘sorted’.
The third section of this
part of the study provides some empirical evidence of the continuing dominance
of animal welfarism in the face of the emergence of ‘second-wave’ animal
advocacy. Therefore, it contemplates some
aspects of what might be termed ‘the
social reception’ to the emergence of animal rights and/or animal liberation
thought and campaigns in the last few
decades. Although recent rights
advocates assert that, for example, Peter Singer’s utilitarian ‘animal
liberation’ perspective is a form of modern-day animal
welfarism, the animal liberation position is
nevertheless regarded by most as more radical and far-reaching than traditional welfarism
and is the perspective usually adopted by advocates who dislike using rights as
the basis of their claims on behalf on nonhuman animals.[2] This particular section concentrates mainly
on what pro-use countermovements and mass media commentators have made of the
claims (and the related activities) of modern animal advocates, whether
correctly labelled animal rightists or not.
Again, and predictably, orthodox welfarist understandings concerning
human-nonhuman relations are almost universally used as resources to severely
criticise contemporary ‘rights’ thinking.
The orthodoxy is seen to provide an established position of ‘care’ about
animals from which the ‘extremism’ of the ‘animal rights’ case can be
highlighted, or ‘de-bunked’, as one pro-use internet
site would have it.
Finally, the thesis endeavours to ask a rather blunt
question that should interest any claims-making animal advocate: that question is, ‘who is listening?’ Put differently, why should anyone actively engage with or be concerned about animal advocacy messages? Why should any self- protecting audience face in any depth the often gory details of
what humans routinely do to other animals: or with any information which may cause them discomfort and pain? This final
section,
therefore, will outline some general strands of the complex social psychology
of being the recipient of potentially distressing
information. It highlights how
activities and campaigns seen by social movement activists as ‘public education
initiatives’ may be received by many as a form of pain that they may wish to - and will take steps to - avoid.
Notions such as so-called
‘compassion fatigue’ may explain why some individuals will go to
considerable lengths to avoid, resist
and even actively evade the
information that many social movements attempt to place before them. However, there are ‘deeper’ levels to forms of denial or ‘information resistance’. In fact, Cohen (2001: 187) states that the
basic notion of compassion fatigue is itself built upon three overlapping
concepts: information overload,
normalisation and desensitisation. Moreover, other influential
elements of ‘denial’ or ‘blocking’ may be acknowledged, recognising that such impulses are ostensibly based on entirely reasonable desires, oriented
toward eliminating or reducing ‘unpleasure’, and directed at deliberately
‘putting to one side’, if not absolutely evading in every case, knowledge that
may be intensely painful to know. An important question seems to be raised
again: why should anyone deliberately become embroiled with information that
may - and most likely will - make them uncomfortable, cheerless, depressed,
distressed, and will very probably put them off their dinner?
[2] Francione
(1996) states that Singer’s work is important for two reasons. One, his description of the institutionalised
exploitations of other animals and two, ‘Singer presents a theory that would provide greater protection for animals than has
classical animal welfare’ (1996: 12).
Joan Dunayer (www.upc-online.org/thinking/animal_equality.html) follows Francione’s line that sentiency alone is enough to warrant
that nonhuman rights are respected. She
claims Singer’s position is ‘muddled’ and states that, ‘Actually, Singer
doesn’t believe that any animals,
including humans, should have inviolable rights. He believes that an individual’s well-being
or life can be sacrificed to the “greater good.”’
No comments:
Post a Comment